After mulling it over since the election, I now think I have the core principles and approach at least initially thought through.
The basic principle, as in any conflict, is to play to your strengths against your opponent’s weaknesses. (That for each side the greatest strength and greatest weakness may be the same only underlines this generalization.)
In our case, our greatest strength is in fact our transparency. It was our overall transparency that made the leaks more effective and interesting. The problem was that we are not yet so transparent that they had no effect.
The Russians’ (or rather the Putin’s gang’s) greatest weakness is their lack of transparency, although they would probably regard it as their greatest strength.
So, the overall strategy is simple, to take steps to increase the long term transparency of the Russian system, while showing the extent and consequences of its lack of transparency.
The exact steps matter less than the approach — which is a huge advantage, because only those with deep knowledge of the details can make informed decisions about which tactics will threaten the least risk to our current intelligence gathering activities, while causing the most internal political disruption (most of which will occur inside the system, and not in public.)
Among the steps that might be particularly appropriate:
To Increase Long Term Transparency:
Building the kind of tools that Russians (and the people that work with them) can use to communicate internally without giving themselves away to the Russian security apparatus.
Doing the same for external communications.
Making access available to the record of Russian changes of “truth,” (the “memory hole trap”.)
To Demonstrate the Current Lack of Russian Transparency, and Its Impact
Revealing details of how the Russian media is controlled, particularly with respect to internal scandals and external influence.
Revealing details of how the Russian election system is controlled.
Showing how the hacks is connected to the Russian Government, therby showing that future such steps will be counterproductive in the end.
Of course, every such step has its risks. Secure communications can be used by terrorists. Somehow, however, as a nation interested in both transparency and security, I am confident that we will do a far better job than the Russians. To take no action is to risk surrender.